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Does risk taking behavior reflect intrinsic 
or constructed preferences? This question is 
deeply rooted in psychology and decision sci-
ence, but is still the subject of a lively debate. 
The current paper suggests that the degree of 
support for the idea of consistent constructs 
of risk taking might be contingent upon 
the methodology used in the experiment. 
Specifically, it addresses the properties of two 
main paradigms that have been used to study 
this question: decisions from description and 
decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 
2004). The first paradigm attends to “explicit 
risk taking” extracted from self-reports of 
risky behaviors and/or tasks in which subjects 
are asked to choose between descriptions of 
different outcomes and their associated prob-
abilities. The second paradigm deals with 
“implicit risk taking.” It focuses on experience-
based tasks in which people make repeated 
choices between options without knowing 
their exact payoffs and probabilities. Instead, 
they have to learn them from experience.
Interestingly, while description-based 
studies typically find risk taking to be mostly 
situation-specific, experience-based studies 
show evidence of consistent individual dif-
ferences, and seem able to distinguish popu-
lations associated with risk taking behaviors 
from controls. The current paper will first 
overview some evidence showing the dif-
ference between the paradigms in suggest-
ing stable constructs of risk, and then will 
address properties of these paradigms that 
may contribute to the discrepancies.
EvidEncE for individual 
diffErEncEs in risk Taking from 
dEscripTion-BasEd and 
ExpEriEncE-BasEd Tasks
Until recently, the search for stable constructs 
of risk taking has mainly focused on explicit 
tasks, such as self-report questionnaires and 
description-based tasks. The results from 
those studies, however, showed mainly 
individual inconsistencies (e.g., Schoemaker, 
1990), suggesting that risk taking is mostly 
situation-specific. For example, it might be 
reversed, depending on whether individu-
als are choosing between gains or between 
losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), it 
seems to depend on the exact response mode 
(e.g., choice vs. pricing, see Lichtenstein and 
Slovic, 1971), and it varies across different 
life domains such as financial, health, and 
recreational (Weber et al., 2002; Hanoch 
et al., 2006). Strikingly, even minor changes 
in the question format might reverse prefer-
ences among alternatives. For example, when 
people are asked whether they would accept 
a risky gamble that has a positive expected 
value they tend to reject it, yet when they are 
asked to “choose between” that gamble, and a 
sure zero payoff, they tend to prefer the gam-
ble (Ert and Erev, 2008). These results might 
lead to the conclusion that behavior does 
not depend on stable individual constructs 
of risk taking; rather, it depends mainly on 
situational factors.
However, this conclusion seems incon-
sistent with another line of research that 
focuses on experience-based tasks. In these 
tasks, the risks associated with each option 
are not described to the decision maker. 
Rather, it is only through experiencing the 
different options that the individual can get 
a sense of what actions might be riskier. Two 
well-known examples are the “Iowa gam-
bling task” (IGT) and the “balloon analog 
risk task” (BART). In the IGT, the decision 
maker repeatedly selects among four decks 
of cards. Each deck is associated with a gain 
but also a loss, sometimes a large one. Two 
decks have positive expected value and there-
fore are considered “advantageous.” The 
other two decks are “disadvantageous” since 
they are associated with negative expected 
value. Decisions are made from experience: 
participants do not know the outcomes of 
each deck and have to learn them through 
realizing the outcomes of their selection fol-
lowing each choice. Initially, the IGT was 
found to be effective in differentiating indi-
viduals with bilateral damage to the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortices (VMPC) from 
control subjects (Bechara et al., 1994)
1. This 
deficit was reflected in the task by higher 
selection of disadvantageous decks. Later 
studies showed that the IGT also seems use-
ful in distinguishing control subjects from 
risk taking populations such as chronic drug 
abusers (Yechiam et al., 2005), prisoners 
(Yechiam et al., 2008), and traffic offend-
ers (Lev et al., 2008).
In the second popular task, the BART, 
people pump “air” into a virtual balloon; 
each time they pump, a fixed sum is added 
to their account, but if the balloon pops 
before they cash out, they receive nothing. 
The common measure of risk is the number 
of pumps the subject tries before cashing 
out. Evidence indicates that the BART score 
could be a good predictor of self-reported 
unhealthy risk behaviors (Lejuez et al., 
2002), and that it can differentiate controls 
from drug users and cigarette smokers 
(Lejuez et al., 2003).
The picture emerging from studies of 
the experience-based paradigm suggests 
that behavior is affected by stable individ-
ual differences that account for risk taking 
behaviors. Taken together, the evidence from 
the different paradigms suggests that the 
researcher’s conclusion regarding the role 
of stable individual differences in risk taking 
might vary substantially according to whether 
a description-based task or an experience-
based task was used in the study. The next 
section suggests potential reasons contribut-
ing to the apparent discrepancy between the 
conclusions from the two paradigms.
Explaining ThE discrEpanciEs 
BETwEEn ExpEriEncE-BasEd and 
dEscripTion-BasEd Tasks in 
addrEssing individual risk Taking
Before addressing the different properties of 
each paradigm, it might be constructive to 
note that typical evidence from personality 
1Ventromedial prefrontal cortices lesions are associa-
ted with a syndrome in which individuals have normal 
IQ and reasoning ability, but demonstrate excessive 
risk taking in their decision-making behavior.
www.frontiersin.org  January 2012  | Volume 3  |  Article 7  |  1
OpiniOn Article
published: 25 January 2012
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00007research suggests some support for both the 
situational and the individual trait views. 
Mischel and Shoda (1995) note that “the 
fact that the average cross-situational coeffi-
cients are typically low but non-zero is now 
widely accepted” (p. 247). Support for the 
effect of individual differences is suggested 
by the finding that the typical correlations 
across situations are consistently above zero. 
However, the large variation across situa-
tions suggests that situational factors may 
either mask such inherent tendencies, or at 
least interact with them in a way that results 
in apparently different behaviors (see also 
Weber and Johnson, 2008).
It is natural to assume that the role of 
situational factors will become more appar-
ent when such factors receive more atten-
tion (e.g., when they are more salient). In 
description-based tasks, the situational fac-
tors are central and therefore are salient part 
of the description (e.g., the case of accept-
ing/rejecting an attractive gamble vs. choice 
between sure zero and the gamble). In partic-
ular, they seem to be much more salient than 
in experience-based decisions in which the 
options are not described. Recently, Ert and 
Yechiam (2010) examined the possibility that 
individual differences in risk taking emerging 
from decisions from experience might differ 
from supposedly equivalent individual dif-
ferences in decisions from description. Recall 
that a main finding in the decisions from 
description literature is the reversal of risk 
taking between the gain and loss domains, 
typically referred to as the “reflection effect.” 
For example, while choosing between a sure 
$600 and a gamble that gives equal chances 
of winning $1200 or $0, most people choose 
the certain amount. Yet, in a choice between 
a sure loss of $600 and a gamble providing 
an equal chance of losing $1200 or $0, most 
people prefer the risky gamble (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979). Ert and Yechiam (2010) 
tested this prediction with a simple form of 
an experience-based task in which, instead 
of getting descriptions of the certain amount 
and the gamble, people chose repeatedly 
between two undescribed options, one that 
always yields 600 (−600 in the loss problem) 
and another that yields either 1200 (−1200 in 
the loss problem) or 0 with equal probability. 
The authors found that the aggregate pro-
portion of risk taking replicated the reflec-
tion effect, showing higher risk taking in the 
loss domain. However, the analysis of choice 
at the   individual level showed a   significant 
positive correlation of 0.63 between the 
gain and loss domains, contradicting the 
reflection effect. This observation suggests 
that people who prefer certainty in the gain 
domain also prefer certainty while choosing 
between losses. In another study, Yechiam 
and Ert (2011) gave participants descrip-
tions of these same problems. The aggregate 
results once again revealed higher risk tak-
ing in choice between losses, consistent with 
the reflection effect. However, the analysis 
at the individual level showed no correla-
tion between choices in the gain and loss 
domains. One interpretation of these results 
is that in the experience-based choice, the 
framing of gambles has only a small effect, so 
the tendency to take risks over certain payoffs 
emerges at the individual level. However, this 
tendency might be masked or canceled out 
by the saliency of the framing in the descrip-
tion-based task.
The observation that description-based 
tasks might be more sensitive to framing 
effects than experience-based tasks may 
possibly relate to Langer’s (1989) notion 
of mindfulness vs. mindlessness. Mindful 
decisions are explicit ones in which the deci-
sion maker considers the properties of the 
problem. When the decision maker oper-
ates mindlessly, she tends not to think about 
the properties of the problem, at least not 
explicitly. It is natural to assume that expe-
rience-based decisions are more mindless 
than description-based ones. Interestingly, 
while intuition suggests that to extract indi-
vidual differences one would possibly like 
to encourage the individual to think deeply 
about the task, evidence suggests that such 
thinking might actually bias the decision 
maker to consider irrelevant data. Therefore, 
the decision maker may be more likely to 
exhibit her inherent tendencies while act-
ing mindlessly than while acting mindfully. 
Moreover, while operating mindfully, the 
decision maker might avoid (or approach) 
risks for a variety of strategic reasons that 
could also interfere with her inherent ten-
dencies. In line with this argument, Koritzky 
and Yechiam (2010) found that experience-
based tasks are less sensitive than descrip-
tion-based ones to social-desirability effects. 
When participants were instructed to make a 
“good impression,” they tended to avoid risks 
in description-based tasks more than under 
a control condition in which the instructions 
were neutral. Behavior in the experience-
based task, however, was unaffected by the 
instruction to behave strategically, perhaps 
because it is relatively hard to pinpoint the 
kind of behavior that is expected to make a 
good impression in such tasks.
Additional evidence supporting the 
existence of stable constructs of risk tak-
ing comes from studies in neuroscience, 
showing activities in brain areas that are 
related to risk taking. Interestingly, many 
of those studies seem to use experience-
based tasks in addressing the constructs of 
risk taking behavior. Some studies use the 
aforementioned IGT and BART (Rao et al., 
2008; Lawrence et al., 2009), while others 
use different tasks that are also experience-
based in nature (Critchley et al., 2001; 
Preuschoff et al., 2006; Gianotti et al., 2009). 
This observation also suggests the poten-
tial usefulness of experience-based tasks in 
studying individual differences.
conclusion
In a recent review of studies of individual 
differences in decision-making, Appelt 
et al. (2011) highlighted the importance 
of a standardized approach to studying 
individual differences, and the value of cat-
egorizing the existing measures into mean-
ingful classes that share similar properties. 
The current analysis suggests that one such 
meaningful categorization is the differ-
entiation between description-based and 
experience-based tasks. Evidence suggests 
that experience-based tasks tend to be more 
successful in revealing consistent individual 
differences than description-based tasks. A 
potential reason for this relative success could 
be that experience-based tasks involve more 
mindless than mindfulness decisions and 
thus they are less sensitive to the influence 
of situation-specific factors. The relative suc-
cess of experienced-based tasks in address-
ing individual differences suggests reasons 
for optimism regarding our understanding 
of the role of individual differences in risk 
taking. The high variety of experience-based 
tasks that are currently in use seem to call 
for comparative evaluations of those tasks to 
better understand the contribution of each 
task beyond and above the others. Such anal-
yses may facilitate standardization and could 
further clarify the exact constructs that the 
different tasks aim to address.
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